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 “Existing British citizens are well aware that the country needs immigrants both skilled 
and unskilled…Most people are welcoming. Britain needs immigrants.” 
Introduction to Life in the UK: A Journey to Citizenship Handbook, 2006 
 
“If you come here lawfully, we welcome you. If you are permitted to stay here 
permanently, you become an equal member of our community and become one of us. 
Then you, and all of us, who want to, can worship God in our own way, take pride in our 
different cultures after our own fashion, respect our distinctive histories according to our 
own traditions; but do so within a shared space of shared values in which we take no less 
pride and show no less respect. The right to be different. The duty to integrate. That is 
what being British means”. 
Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Downing Street, December 2006 
 
Problems of population decline and economic competitiveness have prominently 
moved to the forefront of Western European politics. The growth of newly industrialized 
and developing economies abroad alongside rising unemployment (up to 23% for French 
youth!) are only a couple of indicators that, combined with a low birth rate and aging 
population, make for concerned nation-states. In response, states have both actively and 
reluctantly turned to migration.
1 How can one policy produce such contrasting 
sentiments?  On the one hand, states are fully committed to economic migration, while on 
the other hand they balance that need with restrictive arrangements for settlement and 
membership under a banners of ‘community cohesion’ through the promotion of 
integration and ‘common values’ through citizenship acquisition.  It creates a situation 
where entry to the state is encouraged and open (for economic migrants) while the 
entryway to membership in society has become more protected. And whereas this is a 
firm departure from the stereotypical categorizations of Western European states as 
                                                 
1 Jeanette Money (1999:18) makes the conceptual point that control and admission to territory (immigration 
policies) and membership (citizenship) are two facets of the same policy (migration). Despite linguistic 
variation (Money refers to the composite of these two policies as “immigration policy”), in this paper, 
along the guidelines of Geddes (2003) and Hammar (1990), I refer to the view of control alongside 
belonging (citizenship) as constituting “migration policy,” reserving the term “immigration policy” to refer 
to the rights and terms of entry and exit. 
  2countries of ‘zero-immigration,’ the spirit of that identity is carried over to citizenship 
policy where multicultural integration strategies have transitioned to neo-
assimilationism.
2
We can therefore place the requirements promoting integration for settlement and 
naturalization as a unique policy balance to economic migration. Particularly because the 
two policies were presented at the same time, in the same white papers, their relationship 
is striking. Policies of immigration and citizenship inevitably, therefore, interdependent 
but can create an inconsistency where migration is – at the same time – an economic 
opportunity and a social cost. Migration policy is inherently one of tradeoffs for the 
liberal democratic state, where the economic or political ‘need’ for migration can be out 
of sync from the social or political ‘want’ for the preservation of a national community. 
This paper looks at Great Britain as an important case for explaining the inherent 
paradox of migration policy in Western Europe. Where immigration is an opportunity to 
jump-start latent industrial or struggling service economies, it is also a dominant political 
challenge in maintaining national identity and cohesion. This is particularly the case for 
Britain, where national identity is an inchoate, regularly re-defined concept (see Cesarani 
1997; Hampshire 2006). Britain has seen positive economic growth and production in 
opening up their labor market to over half a million A-8 Accession workers, mainly from 
Poland and Lithuania. And under the banner of “controlled migration,” the Labor 
government has introduced a five-tiered, point-based entry system to bring highly skilled 
                                                 
2 I use the term neo-assimilationism to describe the current integration strategy evident in Great Britain, 
France, and the Netherlands, among other countries. While it captures the same process of more traditional 
assimilationism, it asks not for the substitution of culture directly but rather the adoption of the host society 
value system. Joppke refers to this ‘paradox of civic integration’ strategy as one of ‘illiberal liberalism,’ 
where “liberal purposes (shared citizenship, autonomy) [are realized] through illiberal means,” like borders 
and integration requirements for citizenship (2007: 22). And in the words of former Home Secretary Roy 
Jenkins, cited in the Life in the UK Handbook, it is not a “flattening process” but “equal opportunity” (14). 
  3and need-based non-European migrants to Britain. However, where there is a desire to 
meet economic needs through migration, immigration has never been more of a 
contested, salient political issue. The promotion of citizenship requirements emphasizing 
integration (in English language and UK knowledge assessment) for non-EEA migrants, 
is an important innovation for defining British national identity, articulating for the first 
time a set of ‘common values’ to underscore the British national community. Britain’s 
migration calculus, maximizing the economic and social  benefits of immigration against 
the efforts to isolate potential costs of immigration through the first, real definition of 
“Britishness” exemplifies the inherent paradox of migration for Western European states 
where more formed or consolidation visions of nation-state pre-dated large-scale 
migration.  Following a review of context in which migration and citizenship laws were 
changed, discussing Britain’s strategic use of European Enlargement as being able to 
maintain selective admission alongside economic openness, the second part looks at 
British policy in detail by examining the most recent development of immigration and 
citizenship policy, beginning with the 2002 White Paper “Secure Borders, Safe Haven,” 
and manifesting in the 2005 Five-year strategy, “Controlling Our Borders.” Finally, I 
conclude with preliminary comparisons between Britain and other Western European 
countries, who are only now coming to terms with the realization that they are ‘countries 
of immigration,’ taking on all the benefits and responsibilities that come with it. 
 
PARADOX OF MIGRATION: PURSUING OPENNESS THROUGH RESTRICTION? 
What is paradoxical about immigration and citizenship in Great Britain? 
Consistent with the definition, policies are paradoxical when they promote means or a 
  4course of action which would produce an opposite or unexpected outcome than what 
common sense would expect. Migration policies, therefore, would be paradoxical where 
the goal is openness and the policy articulates closure, or when the policy promotes 
closure but the borders are open. However, policy is more nuanced than a zero-sum 
definition would suggest. Migration policy in the UK is a paradox because it presents 
Britain as a country dependent and desirous of immigration, evident in its commitment to 
liberalizing economic migration, but through uncharacteristic use of European 
Enlargement (intra-EU labor movement) and citizenship strategies,
3 has actually created 
a highly restrictive migration scheme maintaining its status or impression as a country 
reluctant and limiting toward immigration. This manifests in both tightened restrictions 
on temporary and low skilled workers, further limitations on asylum seekers (like 
removing the right to work), and renewed attempts to crackdown on illegality. A second 
way in which migration policy is paradoxical is that, despite its best efforts for controlled 
and limited entry, migrants continue to come to Britain in large numbers. While this latter 
contradiction or gap has been prominently addressed in the literature (see Freeman 1995; 
Joppke 1995; and Cornelius et. Al. 2004), this article turns to the former issue with hopes 
of opening up further research. Where new ‘countries of immigration’ (Weil 2001) - 
whose futures clearly lie in the quality and quantity of migration - hold tight to goals of 
‘control’ both on the border and in society, they are making assertions for the 
preservation national citizenship. The concomitant building up (and in Britain’s case - 
invention) of integration criteria for citizenship only furthers this point. So while Britain 
                                                 
3 The criteria for the acquisition of nationality (a legal transformation) are largely parallel to the 
expectations of integration (a social transformation), for citizenship establishes legal bonds to the state 
through the accumulation of rights and simultaneously establishes social bonds to the nation-state through 
full membership (Bauböck 1995).  
 
  5has begun to identify itself as a ‘country of immigration’ it has actually become more 
difficult for immigrants to enter and join British society.  
There is abundant research tracing these inconsistent dynamics of British 
migration policy. Randall Hansen points out that Britain is the model par excellence of 
combining “relatively easy access to nationality with strict migration controls,” and in 
excesses of each thrust, being both slightly more liberal and more restrictive in each 
policy in comparison to the rest of Europe (Hansen 2000: 207). Somerville updates this 
paradox through migration policy under New Labor, where he draws a line from the dual 
approach of migration control and anti-discrimination from the Hattersley equation of the 
early 1960s (Saggar 1992) up to what he describes as a bifurcated migration policy model 
(forthcoming).And Zig Layton-Henry described the “combination of tough political 
rhetoric and liberal policy practice” as likely to remain a “feature of British immigration 
politics” (in Cornelius et al. 2004:332). And while each of these suggests an inherent or 
surprising lack of complementarity between policy at the border and in society, there is 
theoretical grounding to suggest that the control of migration alongside the promotion of 
national cohesion (through access, equality and liberal values) is really interdependent. 
John Torpey poignantly updates Weber’s definition of the state through controlling the 
“legitimate means of movement” (2000: 9), arguing that in order for the state to 
“penetrate” or control defined populations it must first “embrace” or draw-in said 
persons. The emphasis on cohesion in the state has been articulated since citizenship’s 
foundational literature, where T.H. Marshall posits that a “sense of community 
membership based on loyalty to a civilization” is a precondition for conferring rights 
(1950: 24). Rawls also made explicit the connection between a “well-ordered society” 
  6(1993: 35) as a condition for mutual recognition of justice. The logic here, that ‘control’ 
or mutuality through values in society is directly tied to immigration – in the words of 
Rogers Brubaker, that citizenship evolved out of the need to control ‘extra-territorial’ 
movement – is exemplified in the British case, where commitments to economic 
migration have been coupled with concern for the promotion of ‘common values.’ What 
are the conditions under which Britain recognized immigration as both a “social 
problem” and an “economic imperative” – in the words of the Home Office White Paper 
Secure Borders, Safe Haven - and accordingly produced policy changes relating the two 
concerns to the fate of British national community?
4 I argue below that economic 
conditions motivated immigration changes, whereas social conditions motivated 
citizenship changes. But despite the different sources for change, they produce policies of 
similar intent – restriction – despite their stated goals for openness and inclusion, 
respectively.  
 
Economic Sources for Change 
While the outcomes of these policies are intrinsically related, their source for 
change was not. Whereas citizenship changes emerged in the fallout of the 2001 Northern 
Riots, immigration change was grounded in economic imperatives. The Prime Minister’s 
speech to the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in April 2004 was Tony Blair’s 
first major speech on immigration. In it he makes the case why Britain needs migrants for 
                                                 
4 The directionality of this argument – that the state moves to the source - is necessarily a normative one. 
The definition of integration is that of a newcomer coming into a pre-existing framework. This is not to 
overlook important perspectives on the ways in which immigrants, in turn, influence the process of 
integration and the state’s conception of immigration (Geddes 2003). Integration is a two-way, mutually 
influential process, but in studying the crafting of state policies to respond to immigration, it necessitates 
taking the top-down view. 
  7job recruitment, despite public concern for mass immigration, which he describes, is at a 
crucial ‘crunch point’:  
The vast bulk of the British people are not racist. It is in their nature to be 
moderate. But they expect Government to respond to their worries. They can 
accept migration that is controlled and selective. They accept and welcome 
migrants who play by the rules. But they will not accept abuse or absurdity and 
why should they? So now is the time to make the argument for controlled 
migration simultaneous with tackling the abuses we can identify; and then, longer 
term, put in place a system that gives us the best guarantee of future integrity in 
our migration policy… We will neither be Fortress Britain, nor will we be an 
open house. Where necessary, we will tighten the immigration system. Where 
there are abuses we will deal with them, so that public support for the controlled 
migration that benefits Britain is maintained. 
 
But while this call for an immigration regime somewhere between restriction and 
openness was the first public acknowledgment that the goals of economic migration and 
public opinion might be at odds, New Labor’s interest in making the British economy 
more competitive through immigration was evident as early as 1998 with the White 
Paper, Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy (DTI, 1998). 
In it, the idea was proposed to lower immigration barriers for skilled professionals and 
entrepreneurs. This manifested first in the expansion of the work permit system, such as 
allowing for multiple entries and lowering job experience requirement, later with the 
adoption of a points-based skill assessment with the High Skilled Migrant Program, and 
finally culminating in the point-system for all skill levels in the 2006 policy strategy, A 
Points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain (Home Office). And while a 
Sector Based Schemes (SBS) was also created to bring low skilled workers to the UK, 
like the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) both are being phased out under 
the new migration force from Eastern Europe. 
  8Evaluating the economic gains from migration in Britain has become a highly 
politically consequential research topic. Policy think tanks, including the Labour-leaning 
Institute for Public Politics Research (see Sriskandarajah et al., 2005), the National 
Institute for Economic and Social Policy Research and Royal Economic Society, have 
concluded that immigration has yielded unmatched economic benefits for Britain, from 
impact on wage levels (Haque 2002) to economic growth rate and even mitigating a 
pension crisis (Blake and Mayhew 2006). Ernst and Young Item Club, an influential 
economic group who runs quarterly treasury forecasts, estimated that immigration had 
kept inflation and interest rates low and will ad £4bn to GDP in 2007 (2006). And the 
government, of course, is ever- ready with enthusiastic assessments of migrant 
contributions. It is, for example, an oft-cited claim found in the 2002 Home Office 
Research Paper The Migrant Population in the UK: Fiscal effects that immigration 
has contributed approximately £2.5bn to the budget. And by looking at unemployment, 
figures steadily decreased across the past ten years, despite the increase in stock of 
foreign labor as a percentage of the total labor force. And net gains for GDP has also 
grown successively over this period. 
 
[Figure One and Two about here] 
One can abstract from this view that while immigration has increased (despite 
government efforts at minimization) more jobs have been created as a consequence, 
leading migration to positively contribute to overall economic growth.
5  
                                                 
5 A reservation to the overall benefit of migration is the rate at which migrants come the country, which 
could imbalance inflation. 
  9But where there is abundant evidence on the economic benefits of migration, 
there has also been disagreement toward this economic success story. Coleman and 
Rowthorn conclude that economic benefits from migration are “trivial, negative or 
transient” (2004). John Salt of the migration research unit at University College of 
London agrees, stating that “On the whole the economic impact of immigration is 
broadly neutral to mildly positive” (1993). And the conservative, MigrationWatch UK 
has conducted several studies challenging the government’s claims of immigration 
benefits, particularly for large-scale migration, and highlighting many overlooked costs 
of migration, including health services and housing. Most famously, they concluded 
using the governments own assessment that migration contributes approximately 4 pence 
into the pocket of each Briton a week, that immigration benefit is equivalent to a ‘Mars 
bar a month’ (2007). 
While there is debate on the benefits and drawbacks of migration, there is no 
doubt that the influx of over half a million migrants from Eastern European enabled a 
fundamental restructuring of British migration policy. Britain’s uncharacteristic ‘opting-
in’ to opening up its labor market economy to European workers from the A-8 accession 
countries (mainly Poland and Lithuania) upon their entry into the European Union on 
May 1, 2004, has been a powerful strategy for maintaining its status of a ‘country of 
immigration’ without actually opening its front door to a lot of immigrants.
6 Joined only 
by Ireland and Sweden, Britain has created a two-tracked migration scheme, where front-
door migration (based on skill and need through points-based evaluation) is subject to 
                                                 
6 Intra-European movement, while certainly an important facet of migration should be treated as 
qualitatively different as non-European immigration. Whereas the former is predicated by several iterations 
of policy integration and accession, rendering intra-EU migration more a process of fungible labor 
movement, immigration from outside Europe is subject to an entirely different set of barriers for entry, 
characterizing it more strongly as entry than movement.  
  10different criteria and controls than back-door (EEA, only requiring sign-up to the 
Workers Registration Scheme) migration. While it is not possible to obtain exact 
numbers, because self-employment and exit of A-8 workers is not recorded, it is 
estimated that over 600,000 migrants have registered to work with the government, a 
majority of them Polish (DWP 2006: 4). Eastern European workers have been so 
enthusiastic about coming to Britain that the Home Office was able to close off low 
skilled migration from outside of the EU (Home Office 2005a). Through these two-
tracks, Britain has been able to present itself as both a destination for economic 
opportunity while maintaining a restrictive barrier for non-European migration.
7
Likewise, A-8 workers are not subject to integration criteria (like English 
language acquisition and country knowledge assessment) to settle in the UK, unlike 
‘front-door’ migrants. And while there is evidence that A-8 migrants take full advantage 
of English Speakers of Other Language (ESOL) classes (which they get for free by virtue 
of European citizenship), they are not required to demonstrate English proficiency for 
residence, unlike front-door migrants. The premise is that, to use Poland as an example, 
by virtue of meeting various social and economic criteria to enter the European Union, 
Polish workers have already ‘achieved integration’ Second, the very logic of European 
Union membership is that it encourages broad economic development through free 
movement of labor. By using the benefits of European Enlargement, the typically 
Euroskeptical Britain has been able to meet a majority of its lower skilled domestic needs 
                                                 
7 This duality is especially evident in comparing Polish access to the British labor marker to that of 
Romanian and Bulgarian (A-2) workers. As Britain did not allow for the same access at point of access, 
where A-2 Europeans can come and live in Britain freely but cannot work (except through self-
employment). 
  11through European migration. Therefore, Britain has instrumentally used this two-tracked 
system to simultaneously promote and prohibit immigration. 
So where there exists a commitment to liberalizing economic migration across the 
political divide and an opening up of their labor market to mass-Eastern European 
migration ensuring that “Britain continues to benefit from people from abroad who work 
hard and add to our prosperity,” (Home Office 2005a: 5), there has been an equal 
commitment to restricting immigration, with the increase of controls against unauthorized 
and illegal migration, the limitation of rights for asylum seekers (such as work), and even 
the closing of the labor market to the most recent wave of European Accession states 
(Romania and Bulgaria). And while the reasons for immigration change are diverse, from 
interest politics (Freeman 1995) emerging from employer associations like the CBI and 
the British Chamber of Commerce, advocating a “pause” in opening the labor market to 
migrant workers from Romania and Bulgaria (Financial Times 2006), to institutional 
constraints itself, where previous restrictions toward immigration (starting with the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act)  condition current attitudes toward migration, they are 
largely driven by economy-based decisions. Where these unmatched goals of labor 
recruitment and restriction are largely driven by economic considerations, a look at the 
other half of migration policy change – citizenship – reveals different conditions for 
change.  Where Britain boasts one of the most liberal citizenship models in Europe in 
terms of low barrier for access to rights, recent additions of integration criteria (language 
and country knowledge testing) has made settlement and citizenship acquisition 
considerably more difficult. I look at this addition of barriers, concomitant to the 
restrictive turn in immigration policy, as being based in social factors. Factoring in social 
  12costs takes public opinion seriously, but there is ample evidence to suggest that this is an 
important driver in policy change.  
 
Social Sources for Changes 
Perception of mass immigration and its consequences on larger society and 
perceived failures of previous law, lack of organization, and gross system abuses in the 
Immigration Nationality Directorate are all important considerations to take into account 
in explaining migration policy change. While many explanations can be posited, from a 
Huntingtonian cultural clash argument to a European imitation model, where changes in 
the Netherlands – the first move from multiculturalism to civic integration (Joppke 2007), 
we need not look outside of Britain’s domestic politics to locate a strong incentives for 
change. Evidence suggesting a salient role for public opinion appears in the introduction 
of nearly every Home Office document or public statement on immigration. When the 
Labor Government introduced changes to immigration policy, it signified not only an 
attempt to control immigration but also, as former Home Secretary Charles Clarke made 
clear in the Five-year strategy, to restore “public confidence in the immigration system” 
(2005a: 7). The then- Immigration Minister Tony McNulty further articulated this 
important goal during a House of Commons parliamentary debate:  
There is no doubt, in the broadest of terms of British public policy over 30 years, 
that we have collectively run away from a substantive debate on asylum and 
immigration…The quid pro quo for public confidence in a transparent, simplified, 
managed migration system is – this goes to the heart of the Bill – a proper regime, 
which includes employers taking responsibility for dealing with illegal working 
(HC Deb 16 November 2005: cc1062-6). 
 
  13The emphasis on employer accountability is only one of the many problems 
characterizing the old system. Inherent subjectivity in assessment criteria, unsystematic 
decision-making processes, and manifold visa schemes (over eighty visa and quota 
arrangements!) all contributed to a confusing and perceived unwieldy immigration 
system.  The language of “A Points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain,” 
carries the knowledge of this reputation with calls for “simplifying and rationalizing” the 
current immigration system with “objective and transparent criteria” to produce 
“structured and defensible decision-making processes” (2006c: 14-15).  While the 
content of managed migration was to bring skilled and labor based on sector needs, the 
entire transparent restructuring was motivated by this need to boost public confidence in 
the immigration system. This was evident in the set-up of a lengthy, ten-month process of 
active consultation following the launch of the Five-year strategy, Controlling Our 
Borders, from July through November 2005. Soliciting opinions and concerns from 
groups as varied as the CRE to the Confederation of British Industry and Trade Unions 
Congress, this consultation, including stakeholders, small businesses, and academicians, 
demonstrated a clear intent of framing immigration policy changes as a “response” to 
public opinion and in the interest of employers and migrants.
8  Finally, the 2006 reform 
strategy Fair, effective, transparent and trusted: Rebuilding confidence in our 
immigration system signified the transition to this ‘proper regime’ of managed migration. 
While public opinion is generally more restrictive toward immigration, due to 
either a localized perception of competition (Money 1999) or limited information 
generally (Freeman 1995), the meaningful measure is the degree to which policymakers 
                                                 
8 As an example, the Home Office included an overwhelming, 75% response of “yes” to the question “Is 
the current system too complex?” in its partial regulatory impact assessment (2006d). 
  14are aware and constrained (Hansen 2002) by this sentiment.  The number of people who 
claim immigration is a problem is often staggering; an August 2006 poll appearing in the 
Sunday Times indicated that 63% of Britons think “laws on immigration should be much 
tougher,” with an additional 12% thinking immigration should be “stopped altogether” 
(MORI 2006). Additionally, Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of British respondent who 
think “race relations/ immigration/ immigrants is an important issue” (topping off at 45% 
in August 2006) alongside actual intake per year (including asylum seekers and adjusted 
status migrants). 
[Figure Three about here] 
 
 
 While the general trends match up – increased immigration and increased 
perception that immigration is important, public opinion is not consistent or accurate. But 
while public opinion is “unstable and easily manipulated,” Lahav suggests that it still 
matters in “conditioning the debate” (2004: 105, 97). The value of garnering public 
support is not overlooked by the British government, especially when a clear majority 
(75%) find aspects of immigration problematic, who made clear through abundant 
language in the Five-year strategy, that “public confidence in the immigration system is a 
top priority” (2005: 7). Of course, given the gap between the intentions of migration 
policy and actual outcomes, scholars are quick to note that the public need not see real 
change to influence their confidence in government capacity to control immigration of 
government control. For example, Cornelius et al. attribute the rise of “symbolic efforts 
by receiving country governments to deter new immigration” resulting from, among other 
factors, “pressure from an increasingly hostile public opinion” (2004: 40). The very 
theme of ‘common values’ and the restructuring of citizenship acquisition asserting 
  15national characteristics through language and country knowledge criteria may indeed be 
symbolic concessions to public fears, but they are actual barriers for the applicant citizen. 
The perception of control is important, therefore language of control alongside 
concerns for public support proliferate in the new legislation. Where the far right, like the 
British National Party or the UK Independence party, the Conservative opposition, or the 
media have opportunities to drum up anti-immigrant sentiment, the government sees its 
responsibility to temper inauthentic public fears by managing the immigration debate and 
provoking a public debate on ‘common values’ (Geddes 2003).  
The debate over common values and the impact of immigration for British 
community is at the forefront of policy and public debate.  In a 2006 talk entitled Our 
Nation’s Future, Tony Blair describes the costs of immigration and diversity (the two 
concepts being inextricably linked in Britain, where the dominant frame of reference is 
‘race’ not ‘ethnicity’ or ‘religion’ (Bleich 2003)) in explicitly social terms: “We like our 
diversity. But how do we react when that ‘difference’ leads to separation and alienation 
from the values that define what we hold in common? For the first time in a generation 
there is an unease, an anxiety, even at points a resentment that our very openness, our 
willingness to welcome difference … is being used against us” (Blair 2006). Of course, 
much of the subtext underlying this type of integration discourse is terrorism and Islam. 
The reconfiguration of integration was borne out of this underlying subtext, where 
segregation came to a head between white and Muslim communities during the Northern 
Riots of 2001, in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham. The Cantle Report, written in response, 
was the starting point for addressing issues of Muslim exclusion, poverty, unemployment, 
and above all, integration. The suicide bombing by Muslim British nationals on July 7, 
  162005 was seen in the context of this larger chronology of social exclusion and values, as 
indicated by Race Chief Trevor Philips post-7/7 accusation that Britain is “sleepwalking 
into segregation.”  
Rooting citizenship changes toward the promotion of ‘common values’ in public 
opinion is an important distinction for interpreting migration policy change. Whereas 
restriction in immigration policy – directing degrees of openness or closure for migrants 
of various skills and origins – is driven largely by economic competitiveness, restrictions 
on access to citizenship is motivated by perception of social costs, by both the public and 
the government’s perception of public want. The fact is that immigration to Britain, 
unlike traditional settler states, began after the formation of the nation-state, not 
alongside,
9 and given that immigration to Britain has been characterized as largely 
“unwanted” (Hansen 2000; Geddes 2003), the place and relationship of immigrants in 
British society has re-defined the very meaning of diversity and ‘common values’ which 
bind an prominently multicultural British society. This distinction is useful for 
interpreting actual policy change, addressed in the following section. 
 
BRITISH MIGRATION POLICY: RESTRICTIVE TURNS 
  This section explores the contemporary policy developments in immigration and 
citizenship policies, teasing out open and inclusive intents but restrictive outcomes. The 
relationship between restrictive immigration and an articulated concept of citizenship 
through integration were first presented side by side in the 2002 Home Office White 
paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain. While 
                                                 
9 This distinction is found in Joppke (1999), Freeman (1995), and even in the typologies of immigrant-
receiving states of Castles and Miller (1993). 
  17emphasizing secure borders (i.e., organized and enforced border and entry policies) and 
safe haven (a moral commitment to asylum), the subtitle “Integration with Diversity in 
Modern Britain” recognizes the imperative of embracing Britain’s multiple ethnic 
identities. The White paper identifies immigration as both challenging Britain’s 
“concepts of national identity and citizenship” (9) and also economic interests and 
opportunities, ensuring Britain “has the people it needs to prosper in the world economy” 
(11). These nationality and economic concerns were the foundation for both the points-
based migration scheme and citizenship acquisition procedures detailed in the subsequent 
Five-year strategy Controlling Our Borders. In sections titled “Who we admit and why” 
and “Who we allow to stay and why,” the Five-year plan consolidates the strategy of 
controlled cohesion. 
  The new immigration system is one based on self-assessment, where an applicant 
completes an online evaluation of his/her skills guided by objective criteria toward a 
single decision-making process. To diminish the amount of expensive and speculative 
visa applications, this online assessment of skills indicates which tier a potential migrant 
qualifies under for work in the UK which, with the exception of changed skills or 
conditions, is binding.
10 Second, unlike the previous system where applicants underwent 
a two-staged process, first issued an immigrant visa abroad and then assessed of 
employment qualifications by the Home Office (not the employer) in the UK, this is a 
one-staged process which vets the applicant abroad. The new scheme is finally sponsor-
bound, so whereas the applicant was formerly granted a visa for entry and then had to 
                                                 
10 The removal of the appeal process or more precisely, the emplacement of a rationalized appeal process 
was indeed “the “most contentious part of the bill.” Mr. Tony McNulty, “Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Bill reading” (HC Deb 16 November 2005: c1063). The only grounds for appeal are 
administrative (Townsend 2006). 
  18find a job, the new scheme does not permit entry without a certificate of sponsorship for 
employment (with the exception of highly-skilled migrants).  Summarily, the PBS aims 
to replace the old scheme with an objective, transparent, structured system aimed at 
“delivering greater efficiency in decision-making and more certainty for applicants about 
the outcome of their applications” (15). 
The points-based system expands upon the previously established Highly Skilled 
Migrants Programme (HSMP) by creating a five-tiered points-based entry scheme for 
newcomers “explicitly designed to deliver on the U.K.’s economic and control 
objectives” (HO 2005b: 3). The first tier, like HSMP, is reserved for highly skilled 
workers like scientists or entrepreneurs. These work permit holders can enter irrespective 
of previously determined labor needs and without an established job offer. This tier offers 
the most direct route to settlement along with dependents. The second tier is the 
employer-led system of work visa granting. This is for medium-skilled, sponsored 
workers who fill labor needs and shortages identified by the Migration Advisory 
Committee (formerly the Skills Advisory Board), which most recently have included 
positions in the Health and Computer Services sectors (HO 2006d: 18). A “shortage” is 
identified when the resident labor market is unable to fill skill needs.  Tier two also offers 
a route toward settlement after the established five-year residence. The addition of 
dependents to that residency requirement under Tier two is yet to be finalized (Townsend 
2006). The third tier is the low-skilled route, the only remaining route under the new 
system that would be quota-based, operator-led, and subject to review. This third tier is a 
residual category with the intent of eventually “phasing out low-skilled migration” from 
outside the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA). Finally, tiers 
  19four and five take on the various other non-EU or EEA persons seeking temporary stay in 
the UK; Tier four is for students, with regulation of their visa tied to a sponsoring 
institution, and tier five satisfies non-economic objectives of employment (like cultural 
exchange) in temporary/seasonal employment. Tiers three, four and five are explicitly 
temporary. 
  The restrictive hues come out of the points-based system in looking at the 
structure of tiers based on labor shortages. There are some obvious concerns of exclusion, 
as the Home Office acknowledges in its Race Equality Impact Assessment: “Immigration 
control is, by its nature, something which impacts differently on different nationalities” 
(2006d: 39). The most noted of these restrictive changes is in the phasing out of low-
skilled migrant programs “in light of new labor available from the European Union” 
(2005a: 9). Whereas an estimated 5,000 to 18,000 were expected, roughly 600,000 have 
applied to the Work Registration Scheme (Britain’s work benefits program). This sizable 
influx has significantly diminished the need for low skilled migrants from other 
countries. And while the overwhelming number of Eastern European workers has caused 
a backlash by establishing quotas for low skilled workers from the 2007 Enlargement 
(specifically Bulgaria and Romania), the impact on non-European applicants is obvious. 
And while the government does not anticipate a racial impact in the move toward 
more restrictive immigration policies, as articulated in their Impact Assessment, there has 
been a very public campaign to distinguish restriction from racism, seen in Home 
Secretary John Reid’s rejection of the idea that “anybody who talks about immigration is 
somehow a racist.” In looking beyond the low skilled migrant route, past migration 
schemes saw the largest refusal rates for highly skilled persons on applications from 
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South Asia and the West Indies (HO 2006d: 41-43). While these large refusal rates are 
proportional to the volume of visa applications submitted, and a central goal of the PBS is 
to minimize the number of fraudulent and speculative visa applications in the first place, 
the opportunities for migrants in these areas to apply at all is either diminished or highly 
restricted by being contingent on both demand-side labor needs and supply-side skill sets.  
And though this type of restriction has been construed publicly as racial, the clear priority 
in the managed migration scheme, articulated by Charles Clarke, is the UK’s economic 
needs: “If people come from outside that area (this country and the EU) to work they 
should do so on the basis of this country’s national priorities. It is therefore right to set 
skills as the top issue” (HC Deb 7 March 2006: c725). 
Given globalized migration and European Union enlargement, both promoting a 
large degree of movement of persons to the state, immigration policy is used here to 
manage the ends of the skills spectrum, whereby highly skilled migrants are encouraged 
to stay (with a route to permanent settlement and shortened residency requirements) and 
low-skilled and temporary workers find increased barriers to settling in Britain. This 
scheme, to reiterate, does not apply to Eastern European workers form the A-8 accession 
countries, thereby re-enforcing ‘frontdoor’ and ‘backdoor’ opportunities. In linking 
economic to immigration goals, Britain aims to manage the number of newcomers to 
their national community using the market mechanism of demand, as to more nation-
based, cultural appeals. 
But how does this vetting process link up to the intent and outcome of promoting 
national cohesion through ‘common values?’ The perception of a “lack of control,” 
  21driven both by actual government failures as well as public perceptions of government 
competence to control borders are determined less by actual figures of incoming migrants 
but more by the extent to which they see migration as impacting their everyday lives. 
This localizes immigration; the degree to which immigration is perceived of felt to be a 
problem contributes to the extent to which it becomes politically important (Money 
1999). It actually matters very little what happens on the border but matters quite a lot 
what happens on the high street. 
The logic behind the reconfiguration of citizenship was to make the process of 
becoming British something “meaningful and celebratory rather than simply a 
bureaucratic process” (Life in the UK Advisory Group 2004: 11). Alterations to an 
already liberal citizenship policy presented in the White paper and the Five-year strategy 
were, therefore, aimed at adding content to citizenship. And whereas the first goal in 
revising citizenship was to construct British nationality as a meaningful identity, the other 
was to make “outsiders” want to take up that identity. Low take-up rates by permanent 
residents, 28% of eligible residents during the Advisory Group’s examination in 2003 (7), 
was a powerful indicator of perpetuating ethnic division and a lacking identification to 
British values.
11 To overcome this trend, the Life in the UK Advisory Group, formed in 
September 2002 to serve in an advisory capacity on “the method, conduct and 
implementation of a ‘Life in the United Kingdom’ naturalization test” (2003:3), 
acknowledged a unifying, de-racialized meaning of British identity and belonging:  
  To be British … mean[s] that we respect the laws, the elected parliamentary and 
democratic political structures, traditional values of mutual tolerance, respect for 
                                                 
11 The interest in take-up rates as an underlying factor in changing citizenship criteria is also evident in the 
changing statistical reports of the Home Office. The Research Development and Statistics Directorate, 
since 2003, has carried out analyses of citizenship “take-up” rates based on information from the UK 
Labour Force Survey, at the behest of the Life in the UK Advisory Group (HO 2006e: 7). 
  22equal rights and mutual concern; and that we give our allegiance to the state (as 
commonly symbolized in the Crown) in return for its protection. To be British is 
to respect those over-arching specific institutions, values, beliefs and traditions 
that bind us all, the different nations and cultures together in peace and in a legal 
order (2004: 14). 
 
In re-defining British citizenship through civic value-commitments not vague, 
“cultural idioms” (Brubaker 1992),
12  an accessible, inclusive concept of citizenship aims 
to overcome social exclusion associated with immigrant-related diversity. The ‘common 
values’ which British newcomers and natives were expected to uphold, consequently, 
was defined as “how we behave towards each other collectively and that is what binds us 
together, rather than assertions of national, ethnic or religious priorities or particular 
interpretations of history” (Life in the UK Advisory Group And while this assertion of 
common values certain suggests an inclusive goal for citizenship, its implementation 
came through the addition of barrier to settlement and naturalization, a contradiction 
Christian Joppke refers to as ‘illiberal liberalism’ (2007).2003: 12).  
The process of changing citizenship into an instrument promoting integration and 
social cohesion was spearheaded by David Blunkett and Sir Bernard Crick. Matching 
their success in integrating citizenship studies into the National Curriculum, Blunkett 
again tipped Crick to promote an active, civic republican model of citizenship to 
immigrants (Crick 2006) through the establishment of: 
a flexible Program of Studies that will lead not only to formal, legal citizenship 
but also focus at every level on what people need to settle in and begin to be 
equipped to be citizens in the full sense as is now being taught and learnt in our 
schools: active citizenship, interacting supportively and effectively, critically if 
needs be, but acting responsibly towards each other, other communities and 
public authorities (New and the Old 13). 
                                                 
12 Joppke notes this transition among postcolonial states where nation-state centered concepts of 
immigration have been eclipsed by liberal-state ones. Citizenship policies, therefore, “no longer can 
explicitly and directly reproduce and reinvigorate particular nationhood” (2005: 2).  
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The cornerstone upon which this process of “settling in” rests is the ability to 
speak English. The handbook for the citizenship test, “Life in the United Kingdom: A 
Journey to Citizenship,” describes English acquisition as an “immediate need” to using 
the institution of everyday life. Additionally, “the better the command of English, the 
more one can be aware of and able to exercise the rights and duties of both legal and 
active citizens” (2004: 10). Demonstrating a knowledge of English is not just a 
requirement for citizenship,
 13   but a necessity for integration, whereby a “stronger sense 
of social participation and shared values…help strengthen mutual understanding between 
people of diverse cultural background” (HO 2005a: 22-23).  
Acknowledging the direct relationship between language acquisition and 
integration, and appreciating the wide range of language skills among immigrants, the 
Advisory group, supported by the Home Office’s Social Policy Unit in Immigration and 
Nationality Directorate (IND), set forth in advising on two routes to naturalization split 
along English-speaking ability. In effect since November 1, 2005, applicants with 
sufficient English are required to take a 24-question, multiple-choice, computer-based 
citizenship test, “Life in the UK,” at one of many testing centers across the country. The 
first Life in the UK handbook, released in December 2005 served as the information base 
for this exam with questions coming out of chapters 2, 3, and 4 only (“A changing 
society,” “Britain today: a profile,” and “How Britain is governed,” respectively). It tests 
                                                 
13 While a requirement for English knowledge and life in the UK has been requisite for citizenship 
acquisition since the British Nationality Act of 1981, it did not specify the means or need of evidence on 
which to substantiate this requirement until the Nationality, Immigration and citizenship Act of 2002 (I 1(1) 
(c)). 
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2006).  
The second path to naturalization, which while certainly less politicized is more 
frequently used, provides applicants who need to improve their English skills with 
citizenship lessons (a recommended twenty hours) through the ESOL (English for 
Speakers of Other Languages) ‘Skills for Life’ curriculum, the Department for Education 
Service’s national strategy for improving adult literacy and numeracy skills. These 
classes teach “English language in a citizenship context” (Sunderland 2006) based on 
material from the “Citizenship Materials for ESOL Learners” pack, and upon completion, 
learners obtain an accredited qualification.
14 The course route covers twelve areas of 
civic knowledge, including What is citizenship?, parliamentary democracy, Britain in 
Europe and the Commonwealth, Human Rights, Opportunities for participation, Britain 
as a multi-cultural society, employment, health, housing, education, the regions of the 
UK, and knowing the law. These pillars, essentially, of what it means to be British, are 
“menus not prescriptions” (Taylor et al. 2004) whereby ESOL teachers can select among 
any of these, so long as they reach the recommended number of hours of citizenship 
lessons. 
While a goal of presenting these two pathways to citizenship is to encourage 
permanent residents and those with indefinite leave to remain to take up citizenship, it 
also, importantly, provides newcomers who qualify for citizenship a setting for 
integration by learning English and citizenship life skills in a classroom with other 
                                                 
14 The distinction here of teaching language in a civic context is important. There was a great concern by 
ESOL teachers that they were “extensions of the Home Office” by integrating citizenship material into 
what were English-language classes. The concern of serving the needs of the learners was put first in 
explicitly describing these courses as “language with civic content” (Norfield 2006). 
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test have been uneven. The Citizenship for ESOL learner’s route to naturalization has 
been positively evaluated by learners and teachers and successful courses in England 
have been met with efforts at regional implementation in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.
15 But the number of workers from the A8 accession states seeking to improve 
their English for better employment opportunity, and who do not have to pay for classes, 
have led to ESOL classes becoming “grievously overstretched” (ABNI 2006: ii). A three-
year rule requiring non-EU/EAA immigrants be in the UK for three years before 
receiving fee remission for ESOL classes problemetizes the goal of beginning integration 
at the earliest stage possible.
16 Whereas English is critical for participating in Britain’s 
society and labor market, the high costs to acquiring English act as a further only increase 
the chance for permanent social alienation.  
The citizenship test has also had its share of problems.  While for the first four 
months of its implementation, the test passed an approximate 70% of test-takers (HC 
Written Question, April 18 2006), there have been wide reports of cheating and problems 
with the “study guide” itself. The Historical Association has noted several inaccuracies in 
the first chapter, “The Making of the United Kingdom,” and omission of regional content 
which resulted in the exclusion of history-based questions from early tests (Taylor 2006). 
                                                 
15 The Final Report for the “Citizenship Materials for ESOL learners: a development project,” references 
positive responses in a variety of areas, from presentation of the pack to training support from NIACE and 
LLU+ staff. While no survey work has been conducted to measure the effects of the citizenship material, 
interviews with learners have yielded positive results. With regard to regional compatibility, the process of 
adapting language qualification levels and content was problematic, and difficulties encountered in making 
the pack and familiarization courses compatible in Scotland, including translating English qualifications to 
levels determined by the Scottish Qualification Authority (SQA), and recruiting ESOL teachers in Dundee 
and Inverness, served as good lessons for subsequent implementation in Northern Ireland. 
16 The three-year rule is the outcome of limited funds in DfES (Norfield 2006). It is based on the 
establishment of home student status. Non-EU/EAA immigrants need to meet a three year residency 
requirement, and spouses in England can receive home student status after one year. Scotland does not have 
a three-year rule, and immigrants can receive free English and skills education from the beginning of their 
residency. 
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ESOL Entry Level Three /Intermediate One, the required English proficiency needed to 
take the exam (Kiwan 2006). The second edition of the handbook, written by an ESOL 
teacher, has been a major initiative of the Advisory Board on Naturalization and 
Integration (ABNI), an independent advisory body created from a recommendation of the 
Advisory Group, to maintain their advisory role for the government on citizenship and 
integration programs. 
Finally, in addition to the two routes for naturalization, each fulfilling the 
requirement for demonstrating English and knowledge of life in the UK, the new 
citizenship agenda provides for an American-styled citizenship ceremony at the 
culmination of the naturalization process. The White paper builds the concern emerging 
from the 2001 race riots for the establishment of “common elements of nationhood” 
(Cantle 2001: 19) into the new citizenship ceremony by requiring an oath of allegiance to 
the monarchy and a pledge to uphold the democratic values of the state.  New citizens are 
presented with a certificate of naturalization and a welcome pack, containing information 
on voting.  
These changes toward establishing a “wider, active citizenship” all share the 
intention of promoting broad cohesion under a distinct, de-ethnicized definition of 
Britishness, but by adding more restrictions for settlement (as of April 2007) and 
naturalization; maintain the paradoxical logic of migration. Those extra steps required for 
settlement and citizenship, while incorporating one into a national community of rights 
and belonging, has been perceived by many applicants as excessively bureaucratic, 
indicated by the enormous jump in British citizen applicants in 2005 (up 64% from 2004) 
  27before the new knowledge of life in the UK requirement was introduced in November 
(HO 2006e). The barrier for admission to society is much greater, though the membership 
to that society is based on minimal value commitments.  
 
CONCLUSION: A NEW DIRECTION FOR COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION? 
By allowing, in the language of the Five-year strategy, “a small proportion of 
[people] to settle permanently where there is clear economic benefit and where they are 
prepared to integrate socially” (2005a: 8), policymakers are directly influencing a future 
vision of Britain’s national community. It encourages newcomers to join its community, 
but admits only certain newcomers to that possibility. And furthermore, where they type 
of ‘common values’ and means of integration are promoted as the lowest common 
denominator between multicultural groups, the barriers to gaining membership have 
become higher as a result of integration criteria for citizenship acquisition and settlement. 
What does this all add up to? Consistent with the paradox of migration, while the goal for 
Britain is promoting itself as a county of immigration committed to economic migration 
and diversity, the content of this policy is one of restriction for both entry and 
establishment. 
  Britain is only one case examined here but there are a panoply of other European 
cases where this dynamic is evident. Taking on the benefits and responsibilities that come 
with the transition to a ‘country of immigration’ requires states to take stock of what it 
means to be a ‘national’ member, particularly in an age of European integration, 
globalization and “deterritorialized politics” (Benhabib 2002). Attracting skilled 
migration has become the zeitgeist of contemporary European migration strategies. From 
  28France to Norway and Italy, countries are re-configuring immigration policies to attract 
the ‘best and the brightest,’ to maintain economic competitiveness in an atmosphere of 
declining native demographics. At the same time, these countries are also pursuing 
citizenship strategies for integration. Notably France, who has linked citizenship and 
assimilation since the mid-nineteenth century, has recently implemented an integration 
contract (contract d’accueil et d’integration) to formalize the obligation to integration 
between the immigrant and the state. And Netherlands, another country with a notably 
liberal citizenship policy in terms of access has added several integration requirements 
for acquisition, including a mandatory integration course, focusing on Dutch proficiency 
and social orientation. 
  The re-design of immigration and citizenship policies is a telling indicator that 
states are adjusting to migration as a reality. Cognizant that there are social and political 
costs alongside economic gains, restriction has been the path through which openness is 
promoted. Because of this paradox, the resulting picture is mixed; where there can be 
economic successes, like Britain’s managed migration strategy, there are inherently some 
failures and unmitigating social costs, such as integration. The balance between these two 
outcomes will be the dominant challenge for the immigrant-receiving nation-states of 
Western Europe for the foreseeable future. 
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Annual GDP charted against percent unemployment by year 
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Figure Three 
 
Perception of immigration as an important issue (“percent”) against Total 
International Migration (“TIM”) to the UK 
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Percent response to the question “What would you say is the most important issue facing 
Britain today?” 
Sources: Ipsos MORI, Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
 
Note: I use the TIM as a source for immigration per year, as opposed to International 
Passenger Survey because the TIM adjusts the IPS to take into account overlooked 
sources for immigration, including movement from Ireland, migration and visitor 
“switchers,” and asylum seekers.  
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